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Abstract
Outsourcing software middlebox (aka. virtual network function) to
third-party service provider, like public cloud, has been a recent
trend for many well-known benefits. However, redirecting large
influx of raw traffic from enterprises to the service providers, who
are often outside the traditional trust domain, raises severe security
concerns. Over the past few years, steady progress has been made
towards enabling the middlebox functionalities without revealing
sensitive traffic. Following the direction, in this paper, we present
LightBox, the first system that can drive full-stack protected stateful
middleboxes at native speed. Similar to existing hardware-assisted
designs, LightBox is built on top of SGX enclave. But, different
from all prior systems, LightBox is designed to further address two
new challenges that, surprisingly, are largely overlooked in the
literature. First, LightBox enables enterprises to safely forward the
packets intended for processing to the enclaved middlebox with all
metadata, including low-level packet headers, packet size, count
and timestamps, fully protected. Studies have shown that such
metadata can be information-rich and potentially exploited bymany
traffic analysis attacks. Second, LightBox achieves very efficient in-
enclave stateful middlebox processing within the highly constraint
enclave space, without incurring unreasonably high overhead. The
confidentiality, integrity, and freshness of the flow states are always
ensured throughout our efficient state management procedures.
Evaluations show that LightBox, with all the extra security benefits,
can still perform packet I/O at 10Gbps line rate. Even when tracking
600K flows, LightBox can obtain 3.5× to 30× performance speedup
than direct adoption of SGX, while incuring negligible packet delay
(<1µs) for most test cases.
1 INTRODUCTION
Middleboxes permeate modern networks, where they undertake
critical network functions for performance, connectivity, and se-
curity [89]. Recently, a paradigm shift of migrating software mid-
dleboxes (aka virtual network functions) to professional service
providers, e.g., public cloud, is taking place for many promised
benefits [14, 35, 78]. But along with this ongoing movement are the
ever-increasing security concerns. As the sensitive enterprise traffic
is now redirected to an untrusted environment for processing [78],
one commonly raised question is: how to protect the sensitive traffic
while maintaining the middlebox functionalities?
Over the past few years, quite a few works have been proposed
to address the problem, and they can be roughly categorized into
two broadly-defined classes: software-centric and hardware-assisted.
Logical connection
Enterprise Network
Real traffic flow
Figure 1: Large influx of traffic is redirected from enterprise
to the untrusted service provider for middlebox processing.
The first line of solutions [10, 18, 32, 55, 79, 96] usually rely on
customized cryptographic scheme. While certain progress has been
made, these customized designs can only support limited middlebox
functionality with usually constraint performance, and thus are not
yet ready for practical deployment. The second line of solutions
rely on trusted hardware. Moving the middlebox processing into
the trusted execution environment, such as Intel SGX Enclave [60],
naturally opens up the possibility to securely support middlebox
functionalities with almost native speed. Based on this, results on
the modular function design and programmability of middlebox [25,
40, 70, 85], easy deployment [64], and code protection [70] have
been made recently.
It is obvious to see that hardware-assisted designs generally pro-
vide better functionality support (indeed, performance as well)
than software-centric approaches. As with these designs, we believe
hardware-assisted approach, and SGX in particular, to be a more
practical starting point for developing secure middlebox solutions.
Some potential threats and security limitations of SGX have been
reported in the past few years [24, 56, 81, 95], hence provoking
discussion on when and how to use this technique properly [91].
In the case of middlebox, we prioritize the consideration of han-
dling its intrinsic complexity and stringent performance require-
ment [17, 47, 68, 78], which at this moment appears unmanageable
with alternative techniques. However, despite promising, we ob-
serve that there are still a number of remaining key challenges,
which, to our best knowledge, are largely overlooked by prior arts
and yet to be successfully tackled.
Necessity for metadata protection. Firstly, most of existing
designs only consider the protection of application data, i.e., the
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transportation-layer (aka Layer-4 or L4) payload. Surprisingly, none
of them fully respect the protection on various traffic metadata,
such as low-level packet headers, packet size, count, timestamps,
etc. Such metadata, often carried by the massive and continuous
influx of raw traffic to be handled by the middlebox (Fig. 1), can
be information-rich, and potentially exploited. The importance of
protecting communication metadata (e.g,. ip address) has been reit-
erated over the years [87, 88]. In the often cited example of Snowden
Leaks, it is frustratedly put as “if you have enough metadata, you
don’t really need content” [73]. In fact, by just exploiting the seem-
ingly trivial metadata like packet size, count and timing, a plethora
of subtle traffic analysis attacks have already been demonstrated to
extract purportedly encrypted application data, including website
objects [90], VoIP conservation [94], streaming video [71], instant
message [26], and mobile user action [23]. Apparently, redirect-
ing massive multi-source traffic to the middlebox service provider
creates a unique vantage point for the adversary to mount attacks
including traffic analyses. A secure middlebox solution should there-
fore ensure full-stack protection over the traffic, covering not only
application contents but all essential metadata.
Necessity for stateful middlebox. Security aside, a solution
should fully account middlebox functionality with stateful pro-
cessing. In contrast with L2 switch and L3 router that process each
packet independently, advanced middleboxes entail various flow-
level states to implement complex functionality [47]. For example,
intrusion detection system (IDS) normally keeps a per-flow stream
buffer, to eradicate cross-packet attacking patterns [46, 82]. Proxies
or load balancers maintain front/back-end connection data and
packet pool, to ensure end-to-end connectivity [4, 69]. These flow-
level states range from a few hundreds of bytes [49] to multiple
KBs [47], and it is not uncommon for deployed middleboxes to han-
dle hundreds of thousands or even millions of flows concurrently in
operating networks [30, 46, 47, 69]. We consider supporting stateful
processing an essential functionality goal of secure middlebox out-
sourcing. These features of stateful middleboxes pose non-trivial
challenge in designing a secure yet efficient solution. As modern
middleboxes usually feature a packet processing delay within a few
tens of µs [17, 46, 59, 68], the secured counterpart should not break
such baseline with unreasonably high security overhead.
Our Work. With respect to the above observations, this paper
presents LightBox, the first system that can drive full-stack pro-
tected stateful middleboxes at native speed. For comparison, we
have summarised existing solutions and compiled their functional-
ity and security features1 in Table. 1. Regarding security, none of
them guarantees full-stack protection, and the closest to LightBox
are Embark [55] and SafeBricks [70]. The former applies determin-
istic encryption to packet headers, and the latter leverages IPSec
to tunnel traffic. Both are vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks [29].
Regarding functionality, the only system that explicitly handles
inspection on reassembled stream is [40]; but it does not consider
the high flow concurrency exhibited in operating networks. More
discussions of these related works are postponed to §8.
As shown in Table 1, LightBox follows the hardware-assisted ap-
proach and is built on top of SGX enclave. Therefore, our full-stack
1We break down the commonly recognized packet metadata into Layer 2-4 packet
headers (HDR) and others like packet size/count, for finer characterization of security.
Table 1: Functionality and security characterization of rep-
resentative solutions for securing middlebox.
Function Protection
Field Op. Stateful Meta HDR P/L Rule State
Software-centric
BlindBox [79] P PM ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ N/A
YWLW16 [96] P PM ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ N/A
SplitBox [10] H+P RM ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ N/A
BlindIDS [18] P PM ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ N/A
SPABox [32] P REX ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ N/A
Embark [55] H+P RM ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ N/A
Hardware-assisted
S-NFV [80] N/A N/A N/A ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
TrustedClick [25] H+P GN ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ N/A
SGX-BOX [40] P GN ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
mbTLS [64] P GN N/S ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ N/S
ShieldBox [85] H+P GN ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ N/A
SafeBrick [70] H+P GN N/S ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ N/S
LightBox H+P GN ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
• Field: which fields are processed, H (L2-L4 headers) and/or P (L4 payload).
• Op. (operation): PM (exact pattern matching) ⊂ RM (range matching)
⊂ REX (regular expression matching) ⊂ GN (generic functions).
• Stateful: whether flow-level stateful processing is supported.
• Meta: meta packet information, e.g., packet size, count and timestamp.
• HDR: L2-L4 headers, e.g., ip address, port number, TCP/IP flags.
• P/L: L4 payloads, including all application content.
• Rule: middlebox processing rules, e.g., attacking signatures.
• State: flow-level states, e.g., connection statistics, stream buffers.
• N/A: the feature is not considered by design.
• N/S: the feature may be potentially supported, but not explicitly handled.
protected stateful middlebox design must also carefully deal with
the notoriously known hardwired limitations of SGX. Specifically,
for strong security, SGX prohibits all operating system services
from within enclave. Accessing system services via enclave exit has
not only significant performance impact (i.e., thousands of cycles
overhead [93]), but also serious security implication (e.g,. Iago at-
tacks [21]), if improperly designed. Besides, in current SGX-enabled
product lines, the secure enclave memory is provisioned with a
very conservative limit of 128 MB. Excessive memory usage in
enclave will trigger procedures of secure paging, which can incur
prohibitive (up to 2000×) performance penalty [9].
With these limitations in mind, the foremost task of LightBox is:
how to securely forward the packets intended for processing to the
enclaved middlebox, without leaking metadata information outside
enclave or during transmission, while making them accessible at
line rate? To address the task, we introduce a virtual network device
called etap, which mimics the classic kernel-driven tun/tap tunnel
device, to realize fast in-enclave packet I/O, without leaving enclave
and incurring extra overhead. For full metadata protection, our
design guarantees the in-enclave access to raw packets with L2-
L4 information, safely delivered via secure TLS tunneling from a
trusted domain at local. To thwart realistic traffic analysis attacks, all
raw packets are first packed into individual TLS records of fixed size
(16 KB) back to back, and then securely transmitted in a streaming
manner. In this way, the exposed traffic information outside enclave
will be irrelevant to the original raw packets intended for middlebox
processing. In addition, we show how to optimize etap with lock-
free packet rings, cache-friendly access, and disciplined batching,
resulting in a performance on par with hardware device. To improve
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the usability of etap, we further build a compatibility layer of
libpcap on top of it, so that many middleboxes can enjoy fast
in-enclave packet I/O without modification of legacy networking
logic. We also port a TCP stream reassembly library to enclave over
etap to facilitate stream-oriented middlebox processing.
Another obstacle we have to deal with is: how to build the
resource-demanding stateful middlebox within the highly con-
straint enclave space, without incurring unreasonably high over-
head? As we just mentioned, stateful middleboxes usually need
to track a large number of flows concurrently. The resulted large
memory demand, which can be up to multiple GBs or more, is
at odds with the limited secure memory supply. To minimise the
possible performance slow down, we have designed complete flow
state management procedures, with compact data structures and
efficient algorithm optimized for the highly constrained enclave
space. To reduce the enclave footprint of stateful middleboxess, we
maintain only a small working set of flow states in enclave, while
keeping the vast remaining of them encrypted in untrusted memory.
We design three compact interlinking structures to facilitate the
lookup of flows in both enclave and outside, as well as secure state
swapping between the two. To further accelerate the flow lookup on
critical path, we devise a cache-efficient dual lookup algorithm with
space-efficient cuckoo hashing. Our scheme ensures the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and freshness of the flow states throughout these
management procedures, and that no useful information about the
states and the processed traffic is ever leaked.
Our evaluations show that with our optimized etap designs,
LightBox allows middlebox to perform in-enclave packet I/O at
10Gpbs line rate, while the packets are fully protected during
transmission or traversal in the untrusted host system. Compared
with a strawman system solely relying on secure paging, LightBox
achieves remarkable performance improvement for two case-study
middleboxes, from 3.5× to 30× speedup when tracking 600K flows.
Indeed, LightBox incurs negligible packet delay (<1µs) to stateful
processing in most test cases. The performance gap between Light-
Box and the strawman is further widened, as more flows are tracked
and more severe paging penalty is imposed on the latter (Fig. 15).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce
system overview in §2. We present the detailed design of etap
in §3 and flow state management in §4. We discuss the extension of
service scenarios in 5, report two instantiations of LightBox in §6
and evaluation results in §7. Related works are discussed in §8 and
the conclusion goes to §9.
2 OVERVIEW
We now present the overview of LightBox, built on top of Intel SGX.
For readers not familiar with the background of SGX, we refer them
to our Appendix A for related concepts used in our presentation,
such as OCALL, Enclave Page Cache (EPC), and EPC paging.
2.1 Service scenario consideration
In this paper, we focus on a basic yet practical service scenario:
the enterprise redirects its sensitive traffic, and its proprietary mid-
dlebox processing rules, to the service provider, which offers the
SGX-enabled computing infrastructure. We first deal with a single
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Figure 2: Overview of main LightBox components.
outsourcedmiddlebox instead of a service function chain [84]. Light-
Box’s design is independent of how the middleboxes are chained
together. In addition, we assume that the middlebox code is not
necessarily private and may be known to the service provider. This
matches practical use case where the source code is free to use but
only bespoke rule sets [83] are proprietary.
These simplifications allow us to concentrate on the core con-
tributions of LightBox, and lay out the design details more clearly.
Nonetheless, we stress that LightBox can be readily adapted to
other service scenarios, which involves only peripheral changes to
the secure bootstrapping process. We postpone the discussions of
other service scenarios to §5.
2.2 System Architecture
Outsourcing model. For ease of presentation, we consider the
well studied bounce model with one gateway [55, 78]: both inbound
and outbound traffic is redirected from an enterprise gateway to the
remote middlebox server for processing, and bounced back to the
gateway. The extension to the model of two gateways can be easily
made by installing one etap-cli (see below) on each gateway.
The communication endpoints may transmit data via TLS con-
nection. To enable such already encrypted traffic to be processed by
the middlebox, the gateway needs to intercept the TLS connection
and decrypt the traffic before redirection. We follow [70] to handle
this issue. In particular, the gateway will receive the TLS session
keys from the endpoints to perform the interception. This process
is invisible to the remote middlebox.
For real-time processing, a stable and high-speed connection
is typically established between enterprise gateway and the mid-
dlebox [78]. Dedicated link services have been widely provisioned
nowadays, for example AWS Direct Connect [11], Azure Express-
Route [12], Google Dedicated Interconnect [36]. The outsourced
middlebox, while being secured, should also be able to process
packet at line rate to benefit from such dedicated link.
LightBox components. LightBox leverages SGX enclave to shield
the outsourced middlebox. As shown in Fig. 2, it consists of two
major modules: virtual network device etap and state management.
The former allows the middlebox to perform packet I/O at line rate
without leaving enclave, and the latter enables the middlebox to
efficiently perform stateful packet processing within constrained
enclave space. A LightBox instance is comprised of the two modules
and the middlebox secured by enclave.
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The etap is peered with one etap-cli installed at the enterprise
gateway. A persistent TLS connection is established between the
two to tunnel the traffic intended for middlebox processing. The
packets are transparently en/decrypted and en/decoded by etap.
The middlebox and upper networking layers that are ported to
enclave can directly read and write packets via etap.
The state management module maintains in enclave a small flow
cache and in untrusted memory a large encrypted flow store, as
well as efficient lookup structures in enclave for searching the two.
The middlebox can supply a flow id to the module to lookup or
remove the corresponding state; in case the state is not present in
the cache, the module will securely swap it with an cached entry,
transparent to the middlebox.
2.3 Porting Middlebox to SGX
An existing middlebox should be first ported to enclave to be driven
by LightBox. The porting can be done in various ways. One ap-
proach is to use pre-ported LibOS [13, 86] to access prohibited
system services. Another more specialized approach is to identify
the system services used by common middlboxes, and customize a
trusted shim layer that can be optimized for performance and TCB
size [58]. Indeed, we have analyzed several popular open source
middleboxes (including PRADS, Snort and HAProxy), and found
thatmost system calls are invoked during initialization or shutdown,
and only very few of them are made in the main packet process-
ing loop (e.g., write and sendmsg for logging). Hence, we follow
this specialized approach in implementing LightBox instances (§6).
Note that some frameworks allow modular development of middle-
box that is automatically secured by SGX [40, 70, 85]. In this case,
LightBox can drive the already protected middleboxes to run fast
in-enclave packet I/O and stateful network functions.
2.4 Secure System Bootstrapping
The enterprise needs to attest the integrity of remotely deployed
LightBox instance in order to launch the service. This is realized
by the standard SGX attestation [8]. Specifically, the owner (viz.,
the enterprise’s network administrator) of the enclave code can
request a hardware-generated security measurement of the enclave
at launch time, and interact with Intel’s IAS API for verification, to
be assured that the enclave is not modified. During attestation, a
secure channel is established to pass configurations (middlebox pro-
cessing rules, etap ring size, state cache size, etc.) to the LightBox
instance. Due to space limit, here we omit a verbose description.
But we remark that for the considered service scenario where only
two parties (enterprise and middlebox server provider) are involved,
a basic attestation protocol between the two and Intel IAS is suffi-
cient. After the attestation, the two major modules of LightBox are
initialized, which are described in corresponding sections.
2.5 Adversary Model
In line with SGX’s security goals, we consider a powerful adversary.
We assume the adversary can gain full control over all user pro-
grams, OS and hypervisor, as well as all hardware components in the
machines, with one exception that it cannot physically manipulate
the processor package. It has complete memory trace of any pro-
cess, except runtime enclave. It is also capable of observing network
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communications, modifying and dropping packets at wish. In par-
ticular, the adversary can log all packets and conduct sophisticated
inference to mine useful information. To our best knowledge,this
last threat, traffic analysis, has never been directly considered or
tackled in the threat model of all existing SGX-enabled systems in
the literature. Yet with LightBox, we directly address this threat
and are able to thwart deliberate traffic analysis attacks.
While igniting renewed passion for hardware-enforced security,
SGX has undergone a diversity of rigorous security evaluation by
the community since its infancy. On one hand, sophisticated side-
channel attacks have been continuously reproduced [16, 37, 39, 63]
or discovered [56, 81, 92, 95] on SGX. On the other hand, responsive
defense mechanisms [22, 24, 38, 77, 81] addressing certain class of
these attacks are proposed at an equal pace. Many SGX-enabled sys-
tems [9, 42, 51, 62, 67, 75] cite side-channel attacks as out of scope,
and leave them to corresponding countermeasures as complements.
So do we in this paper for LightBox. That said, we fully recognize
the security benefits and limitations of SGX, and understand that
they are still under rapid iteration [91]. It is yet by far, arguably,
the most practical solution for a wide class of complicated tasks
including secure middlebox.
Note that we do not deal with denial-of-service attacks. Also, we
assume that the enterprise gateway is always trusted and it is not
necessarily SGX enabled.
3 DESIGN OF ETAP DEVICE
LightBox aims to provide full-stack protection throughout the out-
sourced middlebox service. While the middlebox can be shielded
by enclave, the traffic transmitted between it and gateway may
be observed and tampered with by attackers. We should ensure
that once the packets intended for processing have left gateway
and enclave, no information about them is leaked. Performance,
meanwhile, is on par with the strong protection, as network I/O
efficiency bounds the overall middlebox performance. We should
enable the enclaved middlebox to access packets at line rate. Be-
sides, middleboxes often depend on external libraries for packet
capturing, stream reassembly, and other common networking logic.
It is desirable for them to continue using the libraries inside enclave,
preferably without code modification.
In pursuing above design goals, we develop a virtual network
device called etap (“enclave tap”), much inspired by the classic
tun/tap device2. The tun/tap device is used as an ordinary net-
work interface card (NIC) to tunnel traffic with another peer device
2https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/tuntap.txt
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Algorithm 1: The etap core driver’s RX main loop
1 ocall_fill_rx_bat_buf();
2 check_memory(rx_bat_buf) ; // memory safety check
3 foreach enc_rec in rx_bat_buf do
4 rec_buf = decrypt(enc_rec);
5 finish_pending_partial_pkt(rec_buf);
6 while has_full_pkt(rec_buf) do
7 pkt_info = parse_next_pkt(rec_buf);
8 push_to_rx_etap_ring(pkt_info);
end
9 refresh_pending_partial_pkt(rec_buf);
end
on a remote host. Secure tunneling would be realized with an addi-
tional layer of encryption. However, driven by the untrusted kernel,
tun/tap cannot be directly used by enclave to achieve the desired
strong protection.
The etap device is dedicated for the in-enclave access to raw
packets3 that are securely tunneled from a trusted domain, i.e.,
local enterprise network. The packets are securely transmitted in a
streaming manner (§3.2.1) to thwart various traffic analysis attacks
exploiting meta information (§3.3). We enhance etap with two
distinct features, trusted clock (§3.2.3) and RSS emulation (§3.2.4),
for its practical use in high-speed network. We also synergize a
set of techniques to boost its performance (§3.4) to the line rate
of modern hardware NIC and advanced packet I/O framework
(i.e., 10Gbps+). Similar to tun/tap device, etap is semantically
equivalent to a real NIC, allowing arbitrary networking logic to be
securely implemented on top of it (§3.5).
It is worth noting that the application scenario of etap is not
limited to middlebox. Indeed, it can be used by any SGX application
that desires fast network I/O and secure communication against
traffic analysis attack.
3.1 Architecture
The major components of etap are depicted in Fig. 3. Every etap is
peered with an etap-cli program run by the gateway. A persistent
TLS connection is established between the two for secure traffic
tunneling. Since the connection is expected to be long and stable,
we set the TLS records to the maximum size (i.e., 16KB [27]) for
better efficiency.
At the heart of etap are two rings for queuing packet data: one
for transmitting (TX) and the other for receiving (RX). A packet
is described by a pkt_info structure, which stores in order the
packet size, timestamp, and a buffer for raw packet data. We choose
the packet buffer has a default size of 1.5KB, which is the most
commonly used maximum transmission unit (MTU). Two other
data structures are used in preparing and parsing packets. A batch
buffer stores a multiply of records outside enclave. A record buffer
holds data decrypted from a single TLS record, and auxiliary fields
for handling cross-record packets.
3In the remaining of this paper, we regard raw packet or simply packet as L2 packet
(or more precisely, L2 frame). This is why we name the device etap instead of etun
(tap is for L2 packet and tun for L3).
The etap device is powered by a core driver and a poll driver.
The core driver securely exchanges packets with etap-cli, by co-
ordinating necessary networking, en/decoding and en/decryption;
it sources the RX ring and sinks the TX ring. The poll driver pro-
vides packet access API to upper layers, by interacting with the
RX and TX ring. The core driver also maintains a trusted clock for
in-enclave timing.
3.2 Design Details
3.2.1 Core driver. Upon initialization, the core driver performs
TLS handshake (via OCALL)4 with etap-cli and stores the session
keys inside enclave.
The packets intended for processing are pushed into the estab-
lished secure connection in a back-to-back manner, for the sake of
hiding meta information. During transmission they are effectively
organized into continuous TLS records. Each packet is transmitted
in the exact format of pkt_info by the sender, and therefore the
receiver will be able to recover from the continuous stream the
original packet by first extracting its length, timestamp, and then
the raw packet data. Packet fragmentation will be performed by
etap-cliwhenever necessary, to ensure that the packets redirected
to etap does not exceed the maximum buffer size.
The core driver is run by two dedicated threads, one for a com-
munication direction. The pseudo code in Alg. 1 outlines the core
driver’s main loop at RX side. The OCALL at line 1 is employed to re-
ceive TLS records via untrusted kernel (e.g., normal network socket)
and place them in the receiving batch buffer. Once the buffer is full,
the OCALL returns and the driver validates whether the buffer is en-
tirely located outside enclave (line 2). Note that this step is essential
to defend against memory safety attacks [53, 85]. If the validation
passes, the buffered records are decrypted one by one (line 3–9),
and the packets are parsed in order (line 6–8), all within enclave.
Since the record has fixed size, there may be packets crossing two
records, and they are handled at the begin and end of each record.
Reversing the steps leads to the TX loop of the core driver: packets
are popped from TX ring, organized and encrypted as TLS records
cached in the batch buffer, and sent to the link.
Remark. The design of the core driver is agnostic to how the real
networking outside enclave is performed. For example, it can use
standard kernel networking stack (this is used in our experiments).
For better performance, it can also use fast userspace networking
such as F-Stack [3], which is in turn built with the latest packet I/O
frameworks like DPDK [43] or netmap [72].
3.2.2 Poll driver. The poll driver provides upper-layer access
to etap device. It supplies two basic operations, read_pkt to pop
packets from RX ring, and write_pkt to push packets to TX ring.
For read operation, the driver maintains internally a copy of the
packet popped from RX ring, and returns only a pointer for the
use of upper layer. Unlike the core driver, the poll driver is run by
the middlebox thread. It has two operation modes. In the default
blocking mode, a packet is guaranteed to be read from or write
to etap: in case the RX (resp. TX) ring is empty (resp. full), the
poll driver will spin until the ring is ready, and then continue the
4There have been a few TLS ports to SGX enclave, such as wolfSSL
(https://www.wolfssl.com/wolfssl-with-intel-sgx-and-tls-1-3-tls13/), mbedtls-SGX
(https://github.com/bl4ck5un/mbedtls-SGX)
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operation. In the non-blocking mode, however, the driver returns
immediately if the rings are not ready. This will spare the middlebox
some time for other tasks, e.g., processing cached events.
3.2.3 Trusted timing with etap clock. Middleboxes demands
reliable timing for packet timestamping, event scheduling, and
performance monitoring. The timer should at least cope with the
packet processing rate, i.e., at 10s of microseconds.
The SGX Platform Service Enclave (PSE) provides trusted time
service, which allows application enclave to query a coarse-grain
time (in units of second) relative to a reference point [20]. Appar-
ently, the resolution of this timer is too low for the use of many
real-time systems including middlebox.
Previous systems have thus sought a few alternatives for in-
enclave timing. The most common one uses OS time service with
syscall, by enclave exit [70, 86] or shared memory [9, 67]. Time
source from hardware has also been explored, e.g., PTP clock on
NIC [85]. The latter approach may achieve higher time resolution
than the former. Yet, they both access time from untrusted sources,
thus subject to malicious tampering. Another system [97] fetches
time from a remote trusted source, but the resolution is still quite
low (at 100s of milliseconds) due to its use of heavy web interface.
Since etap is built with strong security in mind, we cannot resort
to an untrusted time source. For example, by manipulating the un-
trusted clock, the middlebox can be tricked to selectively skip sched-
uled tasks. To this end, we design a reliable clock by taking etap’s
architectural advantage. Specifically, we use etap-cli as a trusted
time source and the timestamps attached to packets received by
etap to maintain a trusted clock. The etap periodically exchanges
small heartbeat packets with etap-cli to estimate the latest round-
trip delayTr td . LetTof f be the time zone difference of the gateway
and middlebox server. Upon every received packet, the RX thread
of the core driver updates the clock value by (Tpkt +Tof f +Tr td/2).
We stress that it is still an open problem to provide trusted and
high-resolution time for SGX applications [20, 22]. The proposed
etap clock is sufficient for middlebox processing in the targeted
high-speed network, though further improvement can be explored.
3.2.4 RSS emulation. Some middleboxes utilize multi-threading
to achieve high throughput [28, 46, 47, 76]. The standard parallel
architecture used by them relies on receiver-side scaling (RSS) or
equivalent software approaches to distribute traffic into multiple
queues by flows; each flow is processed in its entirety by one single
thread without affecting others. We equip etap with an emulation
of this NIC feature to cater for multi-threaded middleboxes.
With RSS enabled, multiple RX rings will be created by etap,
and each middlebox thread will be binded to one RX ring. The core
driver will hash the 5-tuple to decide which ring to push a packet,
and the poll driver will only read packets from the ring binded to
the calling thread. As the number of rings increases, the size of
each ring should be kept small to avoid excessive enclave memory
consumption. We discuss the practical ring size in §7.
3.3 Security Guarantee
We now examine the security guarantee of etap. The adversary’s
view of the network communication between etap peers are TLS
records of fixed size. Hence, she can learn what are revealed in
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Figure 4: Performance comparison of applying different syn-
chronization mechanisms to etap, without other optimiza-
tions noted in §3.4.
normal TLS Record Protocol. For example, the record header, MAC,
and L2-L4 information of the gateway and middlebox server. These
pieces of information are however irrelevant to the original packets
intended for middlebox processing, which are entirely encapsulated
and encrypted in the TLS record and only decrypted inside enclave.
The adversary is not able to infer packet boundary, hence packet
headers, payloads, and size of the encapsulated packets, by merely
looking at the TLS records. Nor is she able to learn the exact number
of packets encapsulated in a record, though the number is upper
bounded. In fact, it can be shown in a security simulation that, the
simulator can generate a computationally indistinguishable view
of records to the adversary [15, 33], with only the public L2-L4
information of gateway and middlebox server.
Above analysis implies that any traffic analysis attack attempted
over the original packets will be thwarted, simply because no in-
formation is available to the adversary.
An active adversary may modify the packets. But such modifica-
tion is detectable with the attached MAC in a record. She may also
tamper with the core driver’s interaction with the untrusted world
outside enclave via OCALL. Nevertheless, any tampering, which is ul-
timately reflected in the change of batch buffer and records therein,
will be caught once the driver returns to enclave and performs
memory safety and record integrity checking.
3.4 Performance Boosting
While ensuring strong protection, the etap device is hardly use-
ful if it cannot deliver packets at line rate. We synergize several
techniques to boost its performance. First, to avoid expensive syn-
chronization overhead, we apply a lock-free technique to guard
etap rings. Second, cache miss in enclave pays higher penalty than
outside, so we incorporate cache-friendly ring access. Last, we fine-
tune the batching size to obtain the empirically optimal setting.
Lock-free ring. Since the two etap drivers run in different threads,
the rings should be properly guarded to avoid data corruption. The
trusted synchronization primitives of SGX are too expensive for this
purpose [44]. We conduct preliminary evaluations on etap’s perfor-
mance with trusted mutex and condition variable. The experiment
setup is detailed in §7.We test two possible methods: when failing to
acquire themutex, onemethod (lock, using sgx_thread_mutex_lock)
will exit enclave and wait outside, while the other (trylock, using
sgx_thread_mutex_trylock) will instead spin in enclave. Both
methods have unsatisfying performance, as shown in Fig. 4.
This motivates a lock-free mechanism. We adopt the classic
Lamport algorithm [54] created for the single-producer-single-
consumer scenario, which matches the use case of etap rings. Each
etap ring now maintains two shared control variables, read_pos
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and write_pos, as the index to access the array of pkt_info. Since
read_pos is only updated by the consumer after successful read
and write_pos by the producer after successful write, there is no
race condition and hence no need for locking. The result in Fig. 4
confirms the drastic performance improvement of this design.
Cache-friendly ring access. In above lock-free design, frequent
updates on the shared control variables by the two threads will lead
to intensive cache misses. The penalty of cache miss is significantly
amplified in enclave due to extra data encryption and integrity
checking. This is not desired for high-speed packet processing.
We apply the cache-line protection technique in [57] to relieve
this issue. The idea is to introduce a set of new control variables
local to the producer and consumer, such that they will mostly
manipulate the local variables for operation and only touch the
shared ones on infrequent events. Our evaluations show that this
design has a performance gain up to 31% (Fig. 4 and Fig. 9).
Disciplined record batching. Recall that the core driver uses
bat_buf to receive a multiply of TLS records. The buffer size has
to be properly set for best performance. If too small, the overhead
of OCALL cannot be well amortized. If too large, the core driver
needs longer time to perform I/O: this wastes CPU time not only
for the core driver while waiting I/O outside enclave, but also a
fast poll driver that can easily drain/fill the ring. Through extensive
evaluations, we find a batch size of 10 to be a sweet spot that can
deliver practically best performance for various packet sizes (Fig. 9).
3.5 Usability
Directly accessing etap may be inconvenient. Since it provides the
semantic of a real NIC, customizable networking libraries can be
built on it to cater for the needs of different middleboxes. Below we
describe a few of them that greatly increase the usability of etap.
Compatibility with libpcap. Considering libpcap is widely
used in networking frameworks and middleboxes for packet captur-
ing [2, 5, 52, 72, 82], we create a compatibility layer that implements
libpcap interfaces over etap. We have ported the most commonly
used packet reading routines (e.g., pcap_loop, pcap_next), and
filter routines (e.g., pcap_compile). This allows many systems, in-
cluding the twowe presented in §6, to conveniently access protected
raw packets inside enclave without modifying legacy code.
TCP reassembly. Another common function used by stateful
middleboxes is TCP reassembly, which organizes the TCP payloads
of possibly out-of-order packets into a long stream for subsequent
processing. To facilitate stream-oriented middleboxes such as IDS,
we also port a reassembly library libntoh [6] on top of etap. It
exposes a set of APIs to create stream buffer for new flow, add new
TCP segments, flush the stream buffer with callback, etc. This is
used in one of our case-study middlebox.
Towards more networking stacks. Many other frameworks
could be ported to use etap. For example, a lightweight full TCP/IP
stack lwIP [7] could be ported to serve proxy-like middleboxes, and
a state-of-the-art flow monitoring stack mOS [47] could be ported
to develop stateful middleboxes. Porting them requires mostly en-
gineering effort, and we leave it as future work to enrich etap’s
code base. Note that the middleboxes built with these stacks are
cache_entry*prev;
cache_entry*next;
lkup_entry*lkup;
char	plain_state[N];
fid_t fid;
cache_entry*	state;
int swap_counter;
time_t last_access;
fid_t fid;
store_entry*	state;
int swap_counter;
time_t last_access;
char	enc_state[N];
char	mac[16];
flow_cache lkup_table flow_store
Enclave
Figure 5: Data structures used in flow state management
usually stateful, and so despite the high performance of etap, run-
ning themselves inside enclave efficiently requires delicate state
management. This topic will be covered in next section.
4 FLOW STATE MANAGEMENT
Stateful middlebox demands a large amount of memory to maintain
flow states in operating networks. When running in enclave, such
large memory footprint will incur prohibitive performance over-
head due to expensive EPC paging. This calls for a more efficient
state management scheme to replace naive paging.
Our key insight is, by partitioning flow states into active and in-
active counterparts, together with carefully crafted data structures
and algorithms, it is possible to design a desired scheme attaining
high efficiency while preserving security. The efficiency is gained
by maintaining only a small working set of active flows inside en-
clave, leading to a affordable footprint that prevents EPC paging.
The security is preserved by keeping minimal index information
of all tracked flows within enclave, and always encrypting states
before migrating them to untrusted memory.
We first design a set of compact, interlinked data structures for
holding and searching flow states in enclave and untrusted memory
(§4.1). The data structures promise small enclave memory footprint
and fine-grained data swapping between enclave and untrusted
memory, allowing millions of flows to be tracked concurrently with
marginal overhead. We then specify procedures to track, terminate,
and phase out flow states (§4.2). These procedures ensure that the
vast majority of states stay securely in untrusted memory, with
their confidentiality, integrity and freshness preserved. On the other
hand, only meta management data and a small working set of states
are maintained in enclave. This greatly reduces the overhead of
stateful packet processing. To further improve performance, we
optimize the most frequent operation, flow lookup, with space-
efficient cuckoo hashing and cache-efficient lookup algorithm (§4.3).
Finally, we analyze the security implication of the management
scheme and show that an adversary gains no useful information
throughout the management procedures (§4.4).
Note that we focus on flow-level state, which is the culprit that
overwhelms memory as more flows are tracked by the middlebox.
Other runtime states (e.g., global counters, processing rules and
detection engine) are generally small, and most importantly, they
do not grow with the number of flows. We leave them in enclave, and
managed by EPC paging if necessary.
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4.1 Data Structures
There are three components involved in the state management
framework: 1) flow_cache, which maintains the states of a fixed
number of active flows in enclave; 2) flow_store, which keeps
the encrypted states of inactive flows in untrusted memory; 3)
lkup_table, which allows fast lookup of all flow states from within
enclave. Among them, flow_cache has fixed capacity, and flow_store
and lkup_table can grow as more flows are tracked. Our de-
sign principle is to keep the data structure of flow_cache and
lkup_table functional and minimal, so that they can scale to mil-
lions of concurrent flows. Figure 5 gives an illustration of them.
The flow_cache entry (hereafter, cache_entry holds raw state
data. It maintains two pointers (dotted arrows) to implement the
LRU eviction policy, and a pointer (dashed arrow) to a lkup_table
entry (hereafter, lkup_entry). The flow_store entry (hereafter,
store_entry) holds encrypted state data and authentication MAC;
it does not consume enclave memory. The lkup_entry stores fid,
a pointer (solid arrow) to either cache_entry or store_entry, and
two small fields. The fid represents the conventional 5-tuple to
identify flow. The swap_count serves as a monotonic counter to
ensure the freshness of state; it is initialized to a random value. The
last_access assists flow expiration checking. Note that the design
of lkup_entry is independent of the underlying lookup structure,
which for example can be plain array, search tree or hash table.
Above data structures are very compact, making it efficient
to track millions of flows. Given 8-byte pointer and 13-byte fid,
cache_entry uses 24 bytes per cached flow and lkup_entry uses
33 bytes per tracked flow. Consider a flow_cache with 16K en-
tries, then tracking 1M flows with the proposed data structures
requires about 33.8MB enclave memory in addition to the cached
state, assuming full utilization of the underlying lookup structure.
Memory allocation. We use the default malloc provided by SGX
SDK for the memory allocation of flow_cache and lkup_table.
But to manage entries of flow_store, we design a more efficient al-
locator. It preallocates a sufficiently large pool of empty store_entry
in untrusted memory and tracks them with a free list. We keep
the head pointer and tail pointer of the list in enclave, allowing
(de)allocation of the entries directly fromwithin enclave by manipu-
lating the pointers. Once the preallocated limit is reached, an OCALL
is made to create more free store_entrys in untrusted memory;
this rarely happens and so the performance impact is minimized.
4.2 Management Procedures
In stateful middleboxes, flow tracking refers to the process of finding
the associated flow state with a given fid. It normally takes place
in the early stage of each packet processing cycle. The identified
Algorithm 2: Flow tracking with dual lookup design
Input: A fid extracted from input packet.
Output: The state of flow fid.
1 entry = flow_cache_cuckoo_lkup(fid);
2 if entry empty then // flow_cache miss
3 entry = flow_store_cuckoo_lkup(fid);
4 if entry empty then // flow_store miss
entry = flow_store_alloc();
5 check_memory(entry) ; // memory safety check
6 victim = drop_from_rear(flow_cache);
7 victim = encrypt(victim);
8 swap(entry.state, victim.state);
9 entry = decrypt(entry);
10 raise_to_front(entry, flow_cache);
11 Return entry.state;
state may be accessed anywhere and anytime thereafter in the
packet processing [48, 49]. Thus, it should be pinned in enclave
immediately after flow tracking, so that subsequent functions can
run at native speed.
Initialization. For efficiency, we preallocate entries for all three
components. A random key and IV are drawn with sgx_read_rand
for the authenticated encryption of flow states. These secrets are
always kept inside enclave.
Flow tracking. Given a fid, this main management routine re-
turns a flow state cached in enclave.We first search through lkup_table.
If a hit is generated, decide whether the entry is in flow_cache by
checking the memory location of state pointer. If yes, the real state
data stored by the pointed cache_entry is returned. Otherwise,
we swap the store_entry with the LRU cache_entry, and return
the state stored in the latter. If lkup_table generates a miss, the
flow is treated as a new one. In this case, a new lkup_entry and
store_entry are created; after that, similar swapping is performed
to make room for the new flow. In any case, the LRU pointers in
the cache_entry are updated to make it the head of the list.
The entry swapping involves a series of strictly defined opera-
tions. 1) We check memory safety (i.e., whether entirely outside
enclave) of the candidate store_entry. 2) We encrypt the state
field of the victim LRU cache_entry and move it to a temporary
buffer. 3) We decrypt the state of the store_entry to the just freed
flow_cache cell. 4) We update corresponding lkup_entry and re-
store the lookup consistency. 5) We move the encrypted victim state
to the store_entry, completing the swapping.
Tracking termination. The tracking of a flow can be explicitly ter-
minated, for example upon receiving FIN or RST flag.When this hap-
pens, the corresponding lkup_entry is removed and cache_entry
is nullifiedwith the LRU links updated. Thiswill not affect flow_store,
as the flow state is already cached in enclave.
Expiration checking. We periodically purge expired flow states
to avoid performance degradation. The last access time (in second)
in lkup_entry is updated at the end of each flow tracking with
etap clock. The checking routine will walk through lookup_table
and remove the entries having been inactive for a prescribed period,
and deallocate corresponding store_entrys.
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4.3 Fast Flow Lookup
4.3.1 Performance analysis. The proposed flow tracking process
is simple and efficient. The flow_cache hit indicates the fastest
path, where only a few subsequent pointer updates are needed to
refresh LRU linkage. In case of flow_cache miss and flow_state
hit, two major memory copying (for swapping) and cryptographic
operations are entailed. The case of new flow requires additionally
an insertion for lkup_table and an allocation for flow_state.
The cost of above operations is both small, e.g., about 2.6 mi-
croseconds for the most expensive encrypting operation on a state
as large as 6KB, and constant, i.e., not affected by the number of
tracked flows. In other words, there is little space left to squeeze
efficiency from the entry structures. Indeed, we find it is the lookup
that determines the overall performance of flow tracking.
The cost of lookup has two major sources: one is searching the
underlying lookup structure itself (i.e., a hash table), and the other
is EPC paging if lkup_table grows overly large. For performance
consideration, two corresponding requirements should be therefore
imposed on lkup_table: search and space efficiency.
4.3.2 Dual lookup design with cuckoo hashing. The lookup struc-
ture that simultaneously satisfies above two requirements is cuckoo
hashing table, which has guaranteedO(1) lookup and superior space
efficiency (e.g., 93% load factor with two hash functions and bucket
size of 4) [31]. Recall that cache miss incurs much higher penalty
in enclave than outside. Hash tables are generally cache-unfriendly
by nature [41]. While adopting cuckoo hashing, we can further im-
prove the performance of lookup by increasing its cache efficiency.
The idea is to split lkup_table into a small table dedicated for
flow_cache, and a much larger one for flow_store. The lookup
proceeds by first searching the small table, and then if the flow is
not found, the large one. The smaller table contains same number
of entries as flow_cache and hence has fixed size (i.e., 1.03MB for
32K entries, see §4.1) that can well fit in typical L3 cache (8MB). It is
accessed on every packet and thus is likely to resident in L3 cache
most of the time. On the contrary, the larger table is only touched
when the first search fails. Hence, if the flow_cache miss rate is
low, this dual lookup design should have better cache efficiency.
The management procedures need a little tweak with the dual
lookup design. The flow tracking procedure is described in Alg. 2;
the update of last_access_time and swap_count is not shown.
The tracking termination remains unchanged, and the expiration
checking now just walks through the larger lookup table.
Design validation. We evaluate the two lookup designs with 1M
flows, 512B states and flow_cache of size 32K. Figure 6 reports the
speedup factor of dual lookup over single lookup. As expected, the
lower the miss rate is, the more speedup the dual lookup design
gains. Real-world traffic usually exhibits high temporal locality [19,
50]. We estimate the miss rate of flow_cache over a real trace
(see §7 for details). As shown in Fig. 7, the miss rate is lower than
20% with only 16K cache entries, confirming the high temporal
locality in the trace. To sum up, the dual lookup design can deliver
practically better performance.
Multi-threading support. Recall that the RSSmechanism ensures
that each flow is processed in isolation to other. For amulti-threaded
middlebox, we assign each thread separate set of flow_cache,
lkup_table, and flow_store. There is no intersection between
LightBox
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Figure 8: Service function chain connected by etap.
the sets, and thus all threads can perform flow tracking simulta-
neously without data racing. Note that this partition scheme does
not change memory usage in managing the same number flows,
compared with the single-threaded case.
4.4 Security Analysis
Below we show that the adversary can only gain trivial knowledge
from the management scheme. Also, it cannot manipulate the pro-
cedures to influence middlebox behavior. Therefore, the proposed
scheme retains the same security level as if it is not applied.
We first analyze the adversary’s view throughout the manage-
ment procedures. Among the three components, flow_cache and
lkup_table are always kept in enclave, hence invisible to the ad-
versary. Stored in untrusted memory, flow_store is fully revealed.
The adversary can see its size and each individual store_entry
containing the encrypted flow state and MAC. But she never see
the state in clear text.
She will notice the creation of new flow state, but cannot link it to
a previous one, even if the two belong to the same flow and have the
same initialization values. This is because the swap_count is always
initialized to a random value. Similarly, she is not able to track
the traffic pattern (e.g., packets coming in bursts) of a single flow,
because even if the state is read only, the swap_countwill increment
upon each swapping and produce different ciphertext of the same
flow state. In general, she cannot link any two store_entrys.
The explicit termination of a flow is unknown to the adversary,
because the procedure entirely takes place in enclave. In contract,
she will notice the state removal event during expiration checking.
Yet, this information is useless as the entries are not linkable.
Now we consider an active adversary. Thanks to the authen-
ticated encryption, any modification of existing state_entry is
detectable. Malicious deletion of entry will be caught when the it is
swapped into enclave. The adversary cannot inject fake entry since
lkup_table is inaccessible to her. Furthermore, the replay attack
will be thwarted because swap_count keeps freshness of the state.
5 EXTENSION OF SERVICE SCENARIO
To clearly lay out the core designs of LightBox, so far we have
focused on a basic service scenario. That is, a single middlebox, and
a single service provider hosting the middlebox service. Now we
discuss how some other typical scenarios can be readily supported.
Service function chaining. Sometimes multiple logical middle-
boxes are chained together to process traffic streams, which is
commonly referred to as service function chaining [45, 84].
This service model is considered in two recent works on secure
middlebox outsourcing. SafeBricks chains the middleboxes within
the same enclave, and isolates them by enforcing least privilege on
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each [70]. In comparison, ShieldBox chains the middleboxes with
different enclaves run by different processes on the same physical
machine [85]. Both designs, however, are not suitable for stateful
middlebox that is resource demanding. Recall that EPC has a limited
size of 128MB, which is shared among all cores in a CPU package.
Practical execution of a single stateful middlebox in enclave is
already a non-trivial task — this is what we strive to improve in this
paper, let alone running multiple enclaved stateful middleboxes on
the same machine, where severe performance issue is foreseeable.
To this end, we consider driving each of the middleboxes with
a LightBox instance on a different physical machine5, and chain
them together with etaps. On the chain, one instance’s etap will
be simultaneously peered with previous instance’s etap (or the
etap-cli at gateway), and next instance’s etap (or the etap-cli
at gateway). Specifically, now each etap’s core driver will forward
encrypted traffic stream to the next etap. An illustration is shown
in Fig.8. This way, each middlebox on chain can access packet at
line rate and run at its full speed.
The secure bootstrapping should be adjusted accordingly. In
particular, the network administrator needs to attest each LightBox,
and provision it corresponding peer information.
Disjoint Service Providers. Middlebox outsourcing may span
disjoint set of service providers. For example, a primary one may
provide the networking and computing platform (e.g., cloud), yet the
others can provide bespoke middlebox functions and/or processing
rules (e.g. telecom or cybersecurity companies). Such servicemarket
segmentation calls for a finer control over the composition of the
security solution, manifested in the bootstrapping process.
Thanks to the SGX attestation utility, any participant of the
joint service can attest enclaves on the primary service provider’s
platform. Therefore, they can securely provision their proprietary
code/rule set to a trusted bootstrapping enclave, without others
knowing it. The code can be compiled in the bootstrapping enclave,
and together with the rules, provisioned to LightBox enclave. Note
that LightBox code (etap and state management) is public and open
to inspection by all participants.
We note that such on-the-fly compilation of private code in
enclave is first seen in [75]. And in [70] this idea is applied to boot-
strap secure middlebox with different network function vendors.
Since the envisioned service scenarios are almost the same, we refer
interested readers to [70] for more details.
5Or different computing instance with separate CPU package, depending on the service
provider’s infrastructure
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6 INSTANTIATIONS OF LIGHTBOX
We implement aworking prototype of LightBox based on Linux SGX
SDK v2.0, and instantiate it for two case-study stateful middleboxes.
Both of them depend on libpcre, and we port it as a trusted library
to be used by enclave. Both middleboxes are single-threaded.
PRADS [2]. It detects network assets in packets against predefined
fingerprints and signatures, and has been widely used in academic
researches [34, 47, 49]. PRADS uses libpcap for packet I/O, which
is seamlessly replaced by the compatibility layer we built on etap.
We also substitute its own flow tracking logic with LightBox’s state
management procedures without altering original functionality. In
order to provide the system calls used by PRADS in enclave, we
create a simple shim layer wrapping these calls with OCALL.
lwIDS. Based on a tcp reassembly library libntoh [6], we build a
lightweight IDS that can identify malicious patterns over reassem-
bled data. The flow state of lwIDS has a size of 5.5KB, including the
4KB reassembly buffer. Whenever the buffer is full or the flow is
completed, the buffered content will be flushed and processed by
a group of pattern matching engines. We port libntoh to enclave
and adapt it to use etap and our proposed flow state management.
7 EVALUATIONS
The evaluation consists of two parts: in-enclave packet I/O (§7.2),
where we evaluate etap from various aspects, and the middle-
box (§7.3), where we evaluate LightBox against native and straw-
man approaches for two case-study middleboxes.
7.1 Setup
We use a real SGX-enabled workstation with Intel E3-1505 v5 CPU
and 16GB memory in the experiments. The workstation is equipped
with 1Gbps NIC, which is incapable to reflect etap’s real perfor-
mance, so we prepare two experiment setups described as below.
The first setup is dedicated for evaluations on etap, wherewe run
etap-cli and etap on the same standalone machine and let them
communicate with the fast memory channel via kernel networking.
Note that etap-cli needs no SGX support and runs as a normal
user-land program. To reduce the side effect of running them on
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Figure 16: lwIDS with real trace.
the same machine, we tame the kernel networking buffers such
that they are kept small (500KB) but still performant.
The other setup is deployed in a local 1Gbps LAN,where etap-cli
runs on a separate server machine and communicates with etap
via real link. We use tcpkali [74] to generate concurrent TCP
connections transmitting random payloads between the server and
clients (on other machines in the LAN). We also use a real trace
from CAIDA [1], which contains anonymized L3/L4 header; we
extract the first 100M packets from the trace, and pad them with
random payloads to their original lengths as per the header. The
etap-cli uses libpcap to capture live traffic or read the real trace.
7.2 In-enclave Packet I/O Performance
The etap device determines the performance upper bound of the
enclaved middlebox. It should be able to deliver packets at line
rate. To evaluate etap, we create a bare middlebox which reads
packets from etap and immediately writes them back. Since read
and write of etap are symmetric, hereafter we will focus on the
read performance and refer to the middlebox as PktReader. We keep
a large memory pool (8GB) and feed packets to etap-cli directly
from the pool. Note that the evaluations are conducted with RSS
emulation disabled, i.e., the poll driver is run by one single thread.
Parameterized evaluation. We first investigate how batching
size affects etap performance. The ring is set to 1024. As shown in
Fig. 9, the optimal size appears between 10 and 100 for all packet
sizes. The throughput drops when the batching size becomes either
too small or overly large, matching our expectation and analysis in
§3.4. With a batching size of 10, etap can deliver small 64B packet
at 7.4Gbps or 14.45Mpps, and large 1024B packet at 12.4Gbps or
1.51Mpps, which is commensurate to advanced packet I/O frame-
work on modern 10G NIC [72]. We set 10 as the default batching
size and use this configuration in all following experiments.
Shrinking etap ring is beneficial in that precious enclave re-
source can be saved for middlebox, and in the case of RSS emulation,
more RX rings can be efficiently supported. However, smaller ring
size generally leads to lower I/O throughput. Figure 10 reports the
experiment results with varying ring sizes. As can be seen, the tip-
ping point occurs around 256, where the throughput for all packet
sizes begins to drop exponentially as ring size decreases. Beyond
that and up to 1024, the performance appears insensitive to ring
size. We thus use 256 as the default ring size in subsequent tests.
Resource consumption. The rings contribute to the major etap
enclave memory consumption. One ring uses as small as 0.38MB as
per the default configuration, and a working etap consumes merely
0.76MB. The core driver of etap is run by dedicated threads and
we are also interested in its CPU consumption. The driver will spin
in enclave if the rings are not available, since exiting enclave and
sleeping outside is too costly. This implies that a slow middlebox
thread would cause more processor time for the core driver to spend
in enclave than a fast one. To test this effect, we make PkgReader do
operations with tunable complexity, and estimate the core driver’s
CPU usage under different middlebox throughput. As expected,
figure 11 delineates a clear negative correlation between the CPU
usage of etap and the performance of middlebox itself.
Performance on real trace. Figure 12 shows etap’s performance
on the real CAIDA trace that has an average packet size of 680B.
We estimate the throughput for every 1M packets while replaying
the trace. As shown, although there are small fluctuations overtime
due to varying packet size, the throughput remains stably within
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11 − 12Gbps and 2 − 2.5Mpps. This further demonstrates etap’s
practical performance.
7.3 Middlebox Performance
We evaluate the performance of two stateful middleboxes, PRADS
and lwIDS, with three variants: the vanilla version (denoted as
Native) running as normal program; the naive port to enclave (de-
noted as SGX), which uses EPC paging when necessary; the Light-
Box instance with efficient state management. The SGX port also
uses etap for packet I/O. For LightBox, the number of entries of
flow_cache is set to 32K and 8K for PRADS and lwIDS, respectively.
Controlled live traffic. To have a better understanding of how
stateful middleboxes behave in secure enclave, we test them in a
controlled environment. We establish varying number of concur-
rent TCP connections between clients and the server. The sniffed
traffic will be processed by the middleboxes either on the same
machine or the SGX-enabled one via etap. The experiment envi-
ronment can afford up to 600K connections while PRADS has a
flow size of 124B. To better simulate realistic scenarios where much
higher concurrency and larger state can be encountered, we pad
the flow state of PRADS to 512B. The state of lwIDS is not padded.
Figure 13 reports the average packet processing delay of PRADS
for three packet sizes. We can observe that LightBox adds little
overhead (< 1µs) to native processing regardless of the number
of flows. In contrast, the direct SGX port incurs significant and
increasing overhead after 200K flows, due to the involvement of
EPC paging. Also interesting by comparing the subfigures is that
the SGX port performs worse for smaller packets. This is because
smaller packet leads to higher packet rate while saturating the
link, which in turn implies higher page fault rate. For 600K flows,
LightBox attains 3.5× — 30× speedup over the naive SGX port.
Figure 14 presents similar results for lwIDS. Here, the perfor-
mance of direct SGX port is further degraded, since lwIDS has
larger flow state size than PRADS and its memory footprint ex-
ceeds 550MB even when tracking only 100K flows. For 64B packet,
LightBox introduces 6 − 8µs per-packet delay (4 − 5× to native)
because the state management dominates the whole processing;
nonetheless, it still outperforms the SGX port by 5− 16×. For larger
packets, the network function itself becomes dominant and so the
overhead of LightBox is demoted, as plotted in Fig. 14 (b) and (c).
Real trace. Finally, we evaluate the middleboxes with the CAIDA
trace. We estimate the average packet processing time and number
of tracked flows every 1M packets. Some invalid packets are filtered
out so only 97 data points are collected for each case.
Figure 15 reports the results of PRADS. We can see that packet
delay of the SGX port grows with the number of flows; it needs
about 240µs to process a packet when there are 1.6M flows. Con-
trarily, LightBox maintains low and invariant delay (around 6µs )
throughout the time. A bit surprisingly, it even edges over the na-
tive processing as more flows are tracked, which attributed to an
inefficient chained hashing design used in the native implemen-
tation. This highlights the importance of efficient flow lookup in
stateful middleboxes.
Figure 16 presents the results of lwIDS. Note that compared with
PRADS, the number of flows concurrently tracked by lwIDS de-
creases, because we use a more aggressive strategy for flow deletion
Native SGX LightBox
PRADS 429.24 67.399 928.06
lwIDS 689.11 182.57 685.36
Table 2: Throughput (Mbps) under CAIDA trace.
and expiration checking in lwIDS: a flow is removed immediately
a FIN or RST is seen, and no TIME_WAIT is handled; besides, the
expiration timeout is set to 30s, half of PRADS’s setting. With fewer
flows, the SGX port still performs significantly worse than LightBox
that is on par with native.
We also calculate the overall throughput of processing the entire
trace. Table 2 shows that LightBox can deliver native throughput
for stateful middleboxes on real trace.
8 RELATEDWORKS
Securemiddleboxes. BlindBox [79] is the first system that applies
cryptographic protocols (i.e., searchable encryption and garbled
circuit) to enable inspection on encrypted packet payloads. A list of
follow-up designs are proposed. The work [96] emphasizes on the
protection of middlebox rules and support of more inspection rules.
SPABox [32] and BlindIDS [18] put extra attention on reducing
connection setup cost. Besides payloads, privacy-preserving packet
header checking is also studied. The work [61] considers using
heavy homomorphic encryption for generic network functions.
SplitBox [10] employs a distributed model for a certain class of
packet header processing. Embark [55] introduces a customized
prefix-matching scheme and by combining it with the technique
from [79], supports a wider class of middlebox functionality. These
software-based solutions are generally not yet practical regarding
functionality, especially stateful processing, and performance.
Several attempts have been made to secure middlebox processing
with trusted hardware. S-NFV [80] proposes to protect specifically
the middlebox state, but not the entire middlebox processing over
protected traffic. Trusted Click [25] and ShieldBox[85] port Click
modular router [52] to SGX enclave. But they do not consider the
protection of metadata, and lack support for stateful processing due
to the inherent limitation of Click. SGX-BOX [40] and mbTLS [65]
enable middlebox to intercept TLS connections and securely inspect
traffic in enclave, with primary focus on programmability and real-
world deployment, respectively. Again, they do not address the
concern of metadata privacy. The latest work SafeBricks [70] pays
extra attention on middlebox code protection, and applies IPSec for
secure traffic tunneling. While protecting low-level headers, it is
still vulnerable to various traffic analysis attacks leveraging packet
size and count. None of these hardware-assisted solutions protects
trafficmetadata as LightBox does, nor do they enable running secure
stateful middlebox processing at native speed in real networks.
Other SGX-enabled systems. A lot of systems have been built
with SGX, including data analytics platforms [66, 75, 98], system ser-
vices [9, 13, 42, 86], and more specific ones like smart contract [97]
and Tor network [51]. They mostly utilize the standard secure chan-
nel (i.e., TLS) to provision secret application data to enclave, but
pay little attention on the protection of traffic metadata as we do.
Eleos [67] introduces user-managed paging to alleviate the over-
head of naive EPC paging. It may help with resource-demanding
applications. But since it still entails complex data structures (e.g.,
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page table) and procedures (e.g., address translation, page table
walk), we conjecture that applying it to the case of stateful mid-
dlebox may not achieve the native speed as LightBox does. Some
experimental comparison would be an interesting future work.
9 CONCLUSION
We present LightBox, an SGX-assisted secure middlebox system.
We recognize the necessity of traffic metadata protection in mid-
dlebox outsourcing, which is largely overlooked by prior arts, and
thereby introduce a novel virtual network device, etap, that allows
access to fully protected network packets at line rate without leav-
ing enclave. Considering the importance of flow states in real-world
middleboxes, we also design customized state management scheme
to enable efficient stateful middlebox processing in the highly con-
strained enclave space. Built on top of these two techniques, exten-
sive evaluations on two case-study middleboxes demonstrate that
LightBox can drive stateful middleboxes at lightening speed, even
when tracking millions of flows concurrently.
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A SGX BACKGROUND
SGX introduces a trusted execution environment called enclave
to shield code and data with on-chip engines. It stands out for
the capability to run generic code at processor speed, with practi-
cally strong protection. Despite this, a few limitations are imposed
on the enclave. First, important system services like I/O cannot
be directly accessed from within enclave. From the point of view
of programming, they can be used via a OCALL: it wraps the in-
structions of switching between enclave and normal userspace,
where the system calls are completed. Second, memory access in
enclave incurs performance overhead. The protected memory re-
gion used by enclave is called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). It is carved
out from processor reserved memory with a conservative limit of
128MB in current product lines. Excessive memory usage in enclave
will trigger EPC paging, which can incur prohibitive performance
penalty [9]. Besides, the cost of cache miss while accessing EPC is
higher than normal, due to the cryptographic operations involved
during data transferring between L3 cache and EPC. While such
14
overhead may be masked by some applications, it may become
notable in cache-unfriendly design.
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